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Abstract
This paper examines whether higher oil price volatility causes a reversal in globaliza-
tion. Using a large annual panel data set covering 84 countries all over the world from 1984
to 2008, we investigate the impacts of oil price fluctuations on international trade, namely
exports and imports. We present strong and robust evidence that international trade flows
will be lower when oil prices fluctuate significantly. We therefore conclude that oil price
volatility hurts globalization.
Keywords: oil price shocks; oil price volatility; international trade; reverse globalization
JEL Classification: Q43, F40
∗Corresponding author.
†Phone number: (886) 2-2351-9641 ext 481. Address: Department of Economics, National Taiwan University,
No. 21, Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan. email: sschen@ntu.edu.tw
‡Department of Economics, National Taiwan University. email: b97303141@ntu.edu.tw
1
1 Introduction
It is argued that uncertainty arising from oil price volatility may reduce international trade flows
because it raises the risks faced by both importers and exporters. The impacts of oil price
fluctuations on global trade flows can be understood by the uncertainty channel. Fluctuations
in oil prices may create uncertainty about the future path of the oil price, causing consumers to
postpone irreversible purchases of consumer durable goods, and also causing firms to postpone
irreversible investments. The reduction in domestic consumption and investment expenditures
implies a reduction in aggregate demand, and thus reduces international trade.1 Hence, oil price
uncertainty may thus reverse globalization. This paper empirically examines whether higher oil
price volatility discourages international trade and thus causes deglobalization.
Recent hikes and fluctuations in oil prices since 1999 have attracted attention and invoked
concerns about their devastating effects on a variety of economic activities. The wide variability
of oil prices is shown in Figure 1, which plots the monthly world average oil price from 1957:M1
to 2011:M6. At the end of the 1970s, the price of oil reached around $40/barrel and then started
to fluctuate. From 1999, oil prices began to rise again, especially after 2001, and climbed to
record highs (around $133/barrel) in 2008. They fell back to $40/barrel by the end of 2008, and
then continued to rise thereafter. Moreover, it can be observed that oil prices began to swing
widely in the mid-1980s and continued to until recently. As described in McNally and Levi
(2011),
“...from the late 1970s until just a few years ago, following the price of gasoline was
like riding the Disney World attraction, It’s a Small World: a shifting but gentle,
basically unremarkable experience. But over the past few years, it has felt more
like Space Mountain: unpredictable, scary, and gut-wrenchingly uneven.”
1Regarding the impact of uncertainty shocks, see, e.g., Bernanke (1983) and Bloom (2009).
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It has been shown that the dramatic rise in oil prices during the 1970s was associated with
subsequent economic downturns.2 Although there is some debate as to whether oil price shocks
are the main cause of recessions,3 Hamilton (2009b) asserts that the latest surge in oil prices
between June 2007 and June 2008 was an important factor that contributed to the economic
recession that began in the US in 2007:Q4. Moreover, a number of recent studies show that oil
price shocks have significant effects on a variety of domestic economic activities. An increase in
oil prices has a significant negative impact on GDP growth and contributes to a higher inflation
rate for most countries (see Hamilton (2009a), Cologni and Manera (2008), and Lardic and
Mignon (2008)). Finally, Ordonez et al. (2011) show that the oil price shock is an important
driving force of the cyclical labor adjustments in the US labor market, and the job-finding
probability is the main transmission mechanism of such a shock.
Other than examining the adverse impacts on the domestic economy, it is also of interest to
consider the impacts of spikes and volatility in oil prices from a global perspective. For example,
Rubin (2009) argues that expensive oil makes the world become increasingly localized, and will
eventually cause the end of globalization. As globalization was dependent on cheap transport,
which in turn was dependent on cheap fuel, it is argued that peak oil may reverse globalization.
As higher energy prices are impacting transport costs at an unprecedented rate, the cost of
moving goods may become the largest barrier to global trade. Moreover, sluggish output growth
and high inflation dampen import demand, and thus decrease international trade flows. Finally,
the central bank may tighten monetary policy to offset the inflationary pressure, which results in
an increase in interest rates and a further dampening of domestic demand for imports, leading
to a decline in global trade.
Several previous studies have shown that oil price shocks affect international trade. Theo-
2See Hamilton and Herrera (2004) for a review of the literature.
3See, e.g., Bohi (1989) and Blanchard and Gali (2008)
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retically, Backus and Crucini (2000) consider an international stochastic growth model incorpo-
rating a third country that sells oil. They document that oil price shocks play a substantial role
in explaining changes in the terms of trade in major industrialized countries after the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system. Bridgman (2008) constructs a vertical specialization trade model
with an energy-using transportation sector to investigate how oil prices affect global trade via
changes in transport costs. Empirical evidence provides strong support for the view that oil
price shocks have impacts on global economic activity. Using data from Germany, Lutz and
Meyer (2009) find that an improvement in international competitiveness limits the negative im-
pacts of increased oil prices. Kilian et al. (2009) show how different oil price shocks (demand
and supply shocks) have impacts on several measures of oil exporters’ and oil importers’ exter-
nal balances such as the oil trade balance, the nonoil trade balance, the current account, capital
gains, and changes in net foreign assets. Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010) use vector autore-
gressive (VAR) models to examine the impact of oil price shocks on both oil-producing and
oil-consuming economies. For oil exporters, although they benefit from high oil prices directly,
they are also hurt by the indirect effects of positive oil price shocks, as countries importing oil
will have lower growth and lower import demand, which then curtails the oil producers’ ex-
ports. As for oil importers, they are hurt directly by positive oil price shocks, but may receive
indirect benefits via higher demand from the oil exporters. That is, some of the additional rev-
enues from rising oil prices for oil exporters may be used to increase imports from the rest of the
world, helping to stabilize oil-importing countries. Finally, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2010)
implement a battery of tests for structural breaks and find that oil shocks played the main role
in determining the changes in trade ratios in the 1970s.
Regarding the impact of oil price volatility on economic activity, it has been shown in Fer-
derer (1996) that empirically, oil price variability has an adverse impact on aggregate output.
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Sadorsky (1999) estimates a VAR model and provides evidence that oil price volatility shocks
play an important role in affecting real S& P 500 stock returns. Sadorsky (2003) shows that the
conditional volatilities of oil prices have a significant impact on the conditional volatility of US
technology stock prices. Guo and Kliesen (2005) present evidence that a volatility measure of
oil prices has a negative and significant effect on future gross domestic product growth over the
period 1984–2004. Henriques and Sadorsky (2011) investigate how oil price volatility affects
the strategic investment decisions of a large panel of US firms, and show that there is a U-shaped
relationship between oil price volatility and firm investment. Elder and Serletis (2010) estimate
a bivariate GARCH-in-mean VAR, and find evidence that volatility in oil prices has had a nega-
tive and statistically significant effect on several measures of investment, durables consumption,
and aggregate output.
However, there are few previous empirical studies on oil price volatility and its impacts
on international trade. To fill this gap, this paper empirically investigates whether the spikes,
and in particular the fluctuations, in oil prices discourage international trade. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to examine the impacts of oil price volatility on
international trade using a large panel data set with 84 countries from 1980 to 2008. We first
use a structural VAR model with new identification assumptions proposed by Kilian (2009) to
identify three different structural innovations in the crude oil market: oil supply shock, global
aggregate demand shock, and oil-market-specific demand shock. We then show that the increase
in oil prices due to oil supply shocks discourages trade while the increase in oil prices due to
oil-specific demand has positive impacts on trade. The impacts of a positive global aggregate
demand shock is negative but insignificant.
Moreover, we compute three different measures of oil price volatility using daily oil future
price data: standard deviation, realized volatility, and conditional variance from a GARCH
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model. We then examine the impacts of oil price uncertainty on international trade. Strong
evidence is found that higher oil price fluctuations cause a decline in international trade, which is
robust to alternative measures of oil price fluctuations. We have also shown that such a negative
impact is prominent for net oil importers, while an insignificant effect of oil price volatility for
net oil exporters exists. Finally, we find somewhat weak evidence that for net oil importers,
energy efficiency help mitigate the negative impacts of oil price volatility on international trade.
In sum, we thus conclude that oil price fluctuations hurt globalization.
2 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we first describe how to identify structural oil price shocks in a VAR model
proposed by Kilian (2009). We then present our measures of oil price volatility. Finally, the
empirical models to examine the impacts of oil price variability on international trade will be
discussed.
2.1 Measuring Oil Price Shocks
Using a newly developed measure of global real economic activity, Kilian (2009) employs a
structural VAR analysis disentangling demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market and
finds that the impacts of oil demand and oil supply shocks are quite different. We consider the
following structural VAR model proposed by Kilian (2009):
Φ(L)yt = et, (1)
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where D(L) = I − Φ0 − Φ1L − · · · −ΦpLp is the lag polynomial. Vector yt is:
yt =

∆prodt
reat
ropt

, (2)
where ∆prodt is global crude oil production growth, reat is a measure of real activity in global
industrial commodity markets, and ropt is the log real oil price. It is worth noting that the
data for global crude oil production and real global economic activity are available at monthly
frequency.
The term et represents a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations.
Letting εt denote the vector of the reduced-form VAR innovations, and following the identifica-
tion assumptions in Kilian (2009), we have:

ε
∆prod
1t
εrea2t
ε
rop
3t

=

a11 0 0
a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33


eost
e
gd
t
eodt

. (3)
According to Kilian (2009), eost represents shocks to the global supply of crude oil (“oil supply
shocks”). The second structural shock egdt captures shocks to the global demand for all industrial
commodities (including crude oil) that are driven by global real economic activity (“global
demand shocks”). Shock eodt is the oil-market-specific demand disturbance, which captures the
shift in precautionary demand for crude oil (“oil-market-specific demand shocks”, or simply,
“oil demand shocks”). That is, it reflects increased concerns about the availability of future oil
supplies. We then follow Kilian (2009) to construct measures of the annual shocks by averaging
the monthly structural innovations for each year:
ˆξit =
1
12
12∑
m=1
eim,t, (4)
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where eim,t represents the i-th structural shock in the m-th month of the t-th year of the sample,
and i = {gd, od}. For the oil supply shock, we define it as:
ˆξost = −
1
12
12∑
m=1
eosm,t, (5)
such that a positive value of ˆξost causes an increase in oil prices, which is consistent with ˆξ
gd
t and
ˆξodt . That is, all shocks are normalized such that a given shock implies an increase in the price
of oil.4
2.2 Measuring Oil Price Volatility
We use daily oil price data (opdt ) to compute the annual oil price volatility, ovt. Letting rt =
log(opdt ) − log(opdt−1) be the daily oil price return, and D be the number of trading days in the
year, we consider the following three different measures of oil price volatility.
1. Standard Deviation:
ovt = S Dt =
√√
1
D − 1
D∑
t=1
rt − 1D
D∑
t=1
rt

2
;
2. Realized Volatility:
ovt = RVt =
D∑
t=1
r2t ;
3. GARCH(1,1) model: we consider a GARCH(1,1) model for daily oil price returns:
rt = µ + ǫt, ǫt = ϕtσt, ϕt ∼ N(0, 1),
σ2t = c + aǫ
2
t−1 + bσ2t−1,
4These yearly averages will not be exactly uncorrelated, but their empirical correlation is so low that little is
lost by treating them as uncorrelated.
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and then compute the annual oil price volatility as the average of the daily conditional
variance:
ovt = GARCHt =
1
D
D∑
t=1
σ2t .
2.3 Empirical Model
We now turn to our main focus regarding the impacts of oil price volatility on international trade
by considering the following panel regression model:
∆ log(Trade j,t) = α j + βovt−1 + φos ˆξost + φgd ˆξgdt + φod ˆξodt
+ δ∆ log(Y j,t−1) + θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) + ρ∆ log(Trade j,t−1) + u j,t, (6)
where j = 1, 2, . . . , N is a country index, and t = 1, 2, . . . , T is a time index. Total real trade vol-
ume of country j is the sum of real exports and real imports: Trade j,t = (Exports j,t + Imports j,t).
We use real GDP of country j to measure domestic demand denoted by Y j,t, while Y∗j,t =∑
i, j w j,iYi,t is the distance weighted sum of real GDP for all countries except country j as a
proxy of foreign demand. The weight w j,i is computed by following Harris (1954) as the in-
verse distance between corresponding countries.5
The term ovt is a measure of oil price volatility, and ˆξost , ˆξ
gd
t , and ˆξodt are structural shocks
to oil supply, global demand, and oil-specific demand, respectively, according to equations (4)
and (5). Finally, α j denotes the fixed-effect dummies.
The parameters of interest are β, φos, φgd, and φod. The coefficient β measures the effect
of oil price volatility on international trade, which is expected to be negative. Recall that we
define ˆξost as the negative shock to oil supply. That is, a positive value of ˆξost causes an oil
supply disruption and a higher oil price. As reported in Kilian (2009), unanticipated oil supply
5The data for distance is available on Kristian Skrede Gleditsch’s webpage: http://privatewww.essex.
ac.uk/˜ksg/data-5.html
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disruptions significantly lower real GDP, which lowers demand for imports and hence lowers
international trade. Hence, if φosk < 0, a rise in oil prices due to lower oil production will
decrease trade volumes. A positive value of ˆξgdt−k boosts global demand and hence may increase
international trade, which implies φgd > 0. Oil-specific demand shocks may reflect increased
concerns about future oil supply shortfalls, and raised oil prices due to oil-specific demand
shocks may induce higher oil exports for oil exporters and higher oil import and/or higher
nonoil export for oil importers (see Kilian et al. (2009)). We thus also expect that the oil-
specific demand shock may have an immediately positive impact on trade, φod > 0. Finally,
domestic demand and foreign demand may increase trade as conventional wisdom expects.
3 Data and Preliminary Tests
To construct annual oil price volatility, we follow Henriques and Sadorsky (2011) and use daily
NYMEX futures prices on West Texas Intermediate (WTI), which is available since April 4,
1983 from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).6 We thus investigate annual data
with the sample covering 84 countries from 1984 to 2008 (a total of 2100 observations). The
sample ends in 2008 because of data availability for all countries. A list of the countries is
reported in Table 1.
Data for merchandise exports and imports in current US dollars (lines 70 and 71) are ob-
tained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). GDP data in current US dollars is obtained from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators (WDI). Following Sadorsky (2011), we deflate exports, imports, and GDP by
6The reason we do not use oil spot prices is because of data availability. Daily data for WTI spot oil prices are
only available from January 2, 1986. However, the spot and futures prices are highly correlated, as the correlation
coefficient from January 2, 1986 to August 9, 2011 is 0.9985.
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the PPP relative adjusted consumer price index obtained from Penn World Table (PWT 7.0).7
To estimate the structural shocks from the structural VAR model in equation (1), we use
monthly data from 1973:M1 to 2008:M12. This particular start date of the sample is chosen
subject to the availability of global crude oil production data (barrels per day), which are ob-
tained from the US EIA.8 An index of global real economic activity in industrial commodity
markets as used in Kilian (2009) is available from Lutz Kilian’s website.9 The monthly WTI oil
prices are obtained from the IFS.
As a preliminary investigation, I implement the Im et al. (2003) test (IPS) to examine the
time-series properties of the panel data. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and the IPS test
results (Ztbar and Zt˜bar statistics) for each variable in equation (6). Clearly, all test statistics are
able to reject the null hypothesis that these series contain a unit root.
4 Empirical Results
Figure 2 presents the three structural shocks (ˆξost , ˆξgdt , and ˆξodt ) identified by the structural VAR
model in equation (1), where all shocks are normalized such that a given shock implies an
increase in the price of oil. There are some interesting observations to be made from the time-
series plots. First, the spike in oil prices in 1999 was mainly due to oil supply (following the
Iranian Revolution) and global demand shocks. Moreover, the steep decline in oil price of 2008
is because of the sharp reduction in global demand since the recent global recession resulting
from the financial and credit crunch and the collapse of the mortgage market in 2007.
Figure 3 shows the three alternative measures of oil price volatility: standard deviation
7The Penn World Tables data codes is pc.
8See the August 2011 Monthly Energy Review, the US EIA.
9See http://www-personal.umich.edu/˜lkilian/paperlinks.html.
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(S Dt), realized volatility (RVt), and GARCH conditional variance (GARCHt). It can be ob-
served that these series move together over time, and the correlation coefficients are corr(S Dt,RVt) =
0.979, corr(S Dt,GARCHt) = 0.977, and corr(RVt,GARCHt) = 0.994, respectively. According
to Figures 1 and 3, it is worth noting that oil price volatility rises during periods of sharp oil
price increases (such as 1990 and 2008) and periods of sharp oil price declines (such as 1986).
In Table 3, we report the benchmark empirical results. Results without the other control
variables are shown in the first three columns. Clearly, we have found a negative and signifi-
cant relationship between lagged oil price volatility and international trade, which is robust to
different measures of oil price volatility. That is, higher oil price volatility hurts trade. We then
add other explanatory variables as in equation (6) and show the results in columns (4) to (6).
Most of the signs of the coefficients are as expected. An increase in oil price due to oil supply
shocks discourages trade. On the other hand, a positive oil-specific demand shock has positive
impacts on trade. Finally, higher domestic and foreign demand (proxied by domestic real GDP
and distance-weighted sum of foreign real GDP) induce larger trade. All of the above estimates
are highly statistically significant. Although the impact of a positive global demand shock is
not consistent with prior expectation, the estimate is statistically insignificant. Does oil price
volatility have a substantial effect on trade after controlling for other determinants? Yes. We
can see that the estimates of the coefficients on the three different measures of oil price volatility
are still negative and highly significant. To sum up, we have shown strong evidence that higher
oil price volatility leads to a reduction in international trade.
We further investigate whether the relationship between oil price volatility and trade may
differ for net oil exporters and net oil importers. According to the data for exports and imports of
crude oil including lease condensate (thousand barrels per day) in 2009,10 the net oil exporters
10Data are available on the US Energy Information Administration website.
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in our sample countries are Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Denmark,
Ecuador, Gabon, Guatemala, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and
Venezuela. We then consider the following empirical model:
∆ log(Trade j,t) = α j + β1[ovt−1 × D j,t−1] + β2[ovt−1 × (1 − D j,t−1)] + φos ˆξost + φgd ˆξgdt
+ φod ˆξodt + δ∆ log(Y j,t−1) + θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) + ρ∆ log(Trade j,t−1) + u j,t, (7)
where for all t,
D j,t =

1, if country j is a net oil exporter,
0, otherwise,
is a dummy variable to indicate a net oil-exporting country. Hence, β1 and β2 are coefficients
measuring the impacts of oil price volatility on international trade for net oil-exporting and net
oil-importing countries, respectively.
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that for net oil-importing countries, oil price volatil-
ity significantly reduces trade. However, for net oil exporters, the impacts of oil price volatility
are no longer statistically significant. In Table 4, we also report the F statistics and associated
p-values for testing the null hypothesis that H0 : β1 = β2. Low p-values for the F test provide
evidence that volatility has different consequences for a country’s trade flows, which depends
on whether the country is a net oil exporter or not.
Finally, we investigate how oil price volatility affects exports and imports separately. In Ta-
ble 5, the dependent variables are changes in (log) real merchandise exports (∆ log(Exports j,t))
and imports (∆ log(Imports j,t)), respectively. Evidence presented in Table 5 indicates that higher
oil price volatility hurts exports significantly. However, it is worth nothing that in terms of im-
ports, the impacts are negative though insignificant. As a further investigation, we focus on
how oil price variations affect real exports and real imports for net oil exporters versus net oil
importers. Results in Table 6 show that for net oil importers, oil price fluctuations have signif-
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icantly negative impacts on both exports and imports. As for net oil exporters, the impacts on
imports are all positive while the results are mixed for exports. However, all of the estimates on
the volatility’s impacts are statistically insignificant for net oil exporters.
5 Energy Efficiency and the Volatility’s Impacts
For oil importers the effect of oil price volatility on trade flow may depend on energy efficiency.
That is, the negative impact may decrease due to the declining share of energy in consump-
tion, which in turn may result from more service-oriented economies, more energy-efficient
technologies, and more diversified types of energy consumption.
In order to examine this issue, we consider the following empirical model for net oil im-
porters
∆ log(Trade j,t) = α j + γ(e j,t) × ovt−1 + φos ˆξost + φgd ˆξgdt + φod ˆξodt
+ δ∆ log(Y j,t−1) + θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) + ρ∆ log(Trade j,t−1) + u j,t, (8)
where γ(e j,t) = γ0 + γ1e j,t, and e j,t is the total primary energy consumption per unit of GDP
obtained from the US Energy Information Administration. Lower e j,t indicates lower energy
intensity and higher energy efficiency. If high energy efficiency help mitigate the reverse effects
of oil price volatility, it is expected that γ0 < 0 and γ1 < 0. According to the estimates of γ in
Table 7, no evidence is found that high energy efficiency help mitigate the negative impacts of
oil price fluctuations.
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6 High-Frequency Data
In our main empirical exercise, using a panel data set at an annual frequency allows us to inves-
tigate a large number of countries (84 countries) around the world. However, annual data may
fail to account for some short-run dynamic interactions between variables. To check whether
our main findings are robust, we use quarterly data from 1984:Q1 to 2009:Q4 to re-examine
our main empirical conclusions in light of new evidence from high-frequency data. Now we
obtain 104 time-series observations at the expense of the number of countries, which is reduced
to 17. The sample countries include Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and
the US. Because the Penn World Table data is not available at quarterly frequency, the quarterly
exports, imports, and GDP data in US dollars are now converted into domestic currency, and
then deflated by domestic consumer price index.11
We first show the quarterly structural shocks (ˆξost , ˆξgdt , and ˆξodt ) and the quarterly oil volatility
(S Dt, RVt and GARCHt) in Figures 4 and 5. Comparing Figures 2 and 3, it is of no surprise
that the quarterly data exhibit greater variability. Table 8 reports the results with quarterly panel
data. It is evident that our empirical findings remain unchanged: when oil prices are more
volatile, global trade flows will be lower. We thus conclude that our main results are robust to
higher-frequency data.
11The nominal exchange rates are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Re-
serve Bank of St. Louis, and the consumer prices are obtained from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI)
database.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated whether high oil price volatility causes reverse globalization, i.e., whether
or not oil price fluctuations discourage international trade. Using a large annual panel data set
covering 84 countries all over the world from 1984 to 2008, we found strong evidence that oil
price volatility does decrease global trade flows. We have also considered different structural
oil price shocks following Kilian (2009)’s approach. The evidence suggests that the increase in
oil prices due to oil supply shocks has a significantly negative effect on international trade. On
the other hand, positive oil-specific demand shocks cause higher trade flows.
We further divide the data set into two categories, net oil exporters and net oil importers,
to see whether the oil price volatility international-trade nexus changes for different types of
countries. We show that for net oil-importing countries, the negative impacts on trade from oil
price fluctuations are statistically significant, while an insignificantly positive impact is found
for oil-exporting countries.
The main empirical findings are robust to different measures of globalization (trade, exports,
or imports) and different data frequency. Moreover, it is found that energy efficiency is unable to
mitigate the negative impact of oil price volatility on international trade flows for oil importers.
Our quantitative examination thus concludes that oil price fluctuations hurt globalization.
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Table 1: List of Countries Included in Analysis
Argentina Dominican Republic Korea Rwanda
Australia Ecuador Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Austria Egypt Luxembourg Senegal
Bahamas Finland Madagascar Seychelles
Bahrain France Malawi Singapore
Barbados Gabon Malaysia Solomon Islands
Belize Gambia, Malta Spain
Bolivia Germany Mauritius Sri Lanka
Brazil Greece Mexico Swaziland
Burkina Faso Grenada Morocco Sweden
Burundi Guatemala Nepal Switzerland
Cameroon Honduras Netherlands Thailand
Canada India New Zealand Togo
Central African Indonesia Niger Tonga
Chad Ireland Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago
Colombia Israel Norway Tunisia
Costa Rica Italy Pakistan Turkey
Cote d’Ivoire Jamaica Papua New Guinea United States
Cyprus Japan Peru Uruguay
Denmark Jordan Philippines Vanuatu
Dominica Kenya Portugal Venezuela
Table 2: Im et al. (2003) Panel Unit Root Test Statistics (IPS)
Ztbar Zt˜bar
∆ log(Trade j,t) -19.489 [0.00] -12.033 [0.00]
∆ log(Y j,t−1) -14.175 [0.00] -8.886 [0.00]
∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) -18.062 [0.00] -11.238 [0.00]
Oil Supply Shock (ˆξost ) -22.920 [0.00] -13.674 [0.00]
Global Demand Shock (ˆξgdt ) -20.795 [0.00] -12.839 [0.00]
Oil-Specific Demand Shock (ˆξodt ) -27.042 [0.00] -15.079 [0.00]
Oil Price Volatility (ovt)
Standard Deviation (S Dt) -28.625 [0.00] -16.835 [0.00]
Realized Volatility (RVt) -27.030 [0.00] -16.229 [0.00]
Conditional Variance (GARCHt) -28.591 [0.00] -16.822 [0.00]
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Benchmark Empirical Results (Annual Data, 1984–2008 with 84 Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oil Price Volatility
S Dt−1 -1.005** -1.119**
( 0.448 ) ( 0.547 )
RVt−1 -0.108*** -0.118***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.043 )
GARCHt−1 -24.056*** -26.756***
( 8.418 ) ( 10.258 )
∆ log(Trade j,t−1) -0.078*** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.192*** -0.198*** -0.198***
( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 )
ˆξost -0.058** -0.054** -0.056**
( 0.026 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.026 )
ˆξ
gd
t -0.013 -0.011 -0.011
( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )
ˆξodt 0.040*** 0.039** 0.039**
( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
∆ log(Y j,t−1) 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.256***
( 0.056 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.055 )
∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) 0.074*** 0.082* 0.081*
( 0.044 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.044 )
R2 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.067 0.070 0.069
Note: The empirical model is ∆ log(Trade j,t) = α j + βovt−1 + φos ˆξost + φgd ˆξgdt + φod ˆξodt +
δ∆ log(Y j,t−1)+ θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1)+ρ∆ log(Trade j,t−1)+u j,t, where ovt = S Dt, RVt or GARCHt.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 4: Empirical Results: Net Oil-Importers vs. Net Oil-Exporters (Annual Data, 1984–2008)
(1) (2) (3)
S Dt−1 × D j,t−1 0.673
( 1.085 )
S Dt−1 × (1 − D j,t−1) -1.665***
( 0.616 )
RVt−1 × D j,t−1 0.006
( 0.085 )
RVt−1 × (1 − D j,t−1) -0.155***
( 0.048 )
GARCHt−1 × D j,t−1 1.079
( 20.37 )
GARCHt−1 × (1 − D j,t−1) -35.167***
( 11.549 )
∆ log(Trade j,t−1) -0.191*** -0.198*** -0.197***
( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 )
ˆξost -0.059*** -0.055** -0.056***
( 0.026 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.026 )
ˆξ
gd
t -0.013 -0.011 -0.011
( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )
ˆξodt 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040***
( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
∆ log(Y j,t−1) 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.260***
( 0.056 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.056 )
∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) 0.071* 0.080* 0.079*
( 0.044 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.044 )
R2 0.070 0.072 0.071
F-stat [p-value] 3.651 [0.056] 2.842 [0.092] 2.501 [0.114]
Note: The empirical model is ∆ log(Trade j,t) = α j+β1[ovt−1×D j,t−1]+β2[ovt−1×(1−
D j,t−1)]+φos ˆξost +φgd ˆξgdt +φod ˆξodt +δ∆ log(Y j,t−1)+θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1)+ρ∆ log(Trade j,t−1)+
u j,t, where ovt = S Dt, RVt or GARCHt. Dummy variable D j,t = 1 indicates net
oil exporters while D j,t = 0 represents net oil importers. Standard errors are in
parentheses. F-stat and [p-value] are the F statistic and associated p-value for
testing H0 : β1 = β2 = 0. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5: Exports and Imports (Annual Data, 1984–2008 with 84 Countries)
Exports Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S Dt−1 -1.440*** -0.514
( 0.731 ) ( 0.558 )
RVt−1 -0.136*** -0.067
( 0.057 ) ( 0.044 )
GARCHt−1 -31.192** -14.756
( 13.678 ) ( 10.45 )
∆ log(Export j,t−1) -0.141*** -0.144*** -0.144***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 )
∆ log(Import j,t−1) -0.159*** -0.162*** -0.162***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 )
ˆξost -0.073** -0.070** -0.071** -0.057*** -0.054** -0.055**
( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 )
ˆξ
gd
t -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.01 -0.011
( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
ˆξodt 0.051** 0.049** 0.049** 0.026 0.026 0.026
( 0.022 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
∆ log(Y j,t−1) 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.289***
( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 )
∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) 0.134** 0.141*** 0.140*** -0.035 -0.029 -0.03
( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 )
R2 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.061 0.063 0.062
Note: The empirical model is ∆ log(X j,t) = α j + βovt−1 + φos ˆξost + φgd ˆξgdt + φod ˆξodt +
δ∆ log(Y j,t−1) + θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) + ρ∆ log(X j,t−1) + u j,t, where the dependent variable is Xt =
Exportst or Importst. Oil price volatility is ovt = S Dt, RVt or GARCHt. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
23
Table 6: Exports and Imports for Net Oil-Exporters vs. Net Oil-Importers (Annual Data, 1984–
2008 with 84 Countries)
Exports Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S Dt−1 × D j,t−1 0.051 1.155
( 1.457 ) ( 1.109 )
S Dt−1 × (1 − D j,t−1) -1.894*** -1.027*
( 0.825 ) ( 0.631 )
RVt−1 × D j,t−1 -0.059 0.073
( 0.114 ) ( 0.087 )
RVt−1 × (1 − D j,t−1) -0.159*** -0.110**
( 0.064 ) ( 0.049 )
GARCHt−1 × D j,t−1 -14.467 16.602
( 27.349 ) ( 20.799 )
GARCHt−1 × (1 − D j,t−1) -36.240** -24.360**
( 15.435 ) ( 11.806 )
∆ log(Exports j,t−1) -0.141*** -0.144*** -0.143***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 )
∆ log(Imports j,t−1) -0.159*** -0.163*** -0.163***
( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.033 )
ˆξost -0.074** -0.070** -0.072** -0.058** -0.055** -0.056**
( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 )
ˆξ
gd
t -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.01 -0.011
( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
ˆξodt 0.051** 0.050** 0.050** 0.026 0.026 0.026
( 0.022 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 )
∆ log(Y j,t−1) 0.185*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.293*** 0.29***5 0.295***
( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 )
∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) 0.132** 0.140** 0.138** -0.036 -0.031 -0.032
( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 )
R2 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.064
F-stat 1.398 0.606 0.498 3.028 3.476 3.039
p-value [0.237] [0.436] [0.480] [0.082] [0.062] [0.082]
Note: The empirical model is ∆ log(X j,t) = α j + β1[ovt−1 × D j,t−1] + β2[ovt−1 × (1 − D j,t−1)] + φos ˆξost +
φgd ˆξ
gd
t +φ
od ˆξodt + δ∆ log(Y j,t−1)+ θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1)+ρ∆ log(Trade j,t−1)+u j,t , where the dependent variable
is Xt = Exportst or Importst. Oil price volatility is ovt = S Dt, RVt or GARCHt. Dummy variable
D j,t = 1 indicates net oil exporters while D j,t = 0 represents net oil importers. Standard errors are in
parentheses. F-stat and p-value are the F statistic and associated p-value for testing H0 : β1 = β2 = 0.
Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 7: Energy Efficiency and the Impacts of Oil Price Volatility (Annual Data, 1984–2008
with 67 Countries for Net-Oil Importers)
(1) (2) (3)
S Dt−1 -1.686***
( 0.680 )
S Dt−1 × et 8.99E-05
( 8.30E-05 )
RVt−1 -0.147***
( 0.055 )
RVt−1 × et 4.55E-06
( 7.09E-06 )
GARCHt−1 -33.751***
( 13.219 )
GARCHt−1 × et 0.001
( 0.002 )
∆ log(Trade j,t−1) -0.181*** -0.188*** -0.187***
( 0.032 ) ( 0.032 ) ( 0.032 )
ˆξost -0.191*** -0.186*** -0.188***
( 0.024 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.024 )
ˆξ
gd
t -0.037*** -0.034** -0.034**
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
ˆξodt 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.045***
( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )
∆ log(Y j,t−1) 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.135***
( 0.052 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.052 )
∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) 0.134*** 0.143*** 0.142***
( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 )
R2 0.104 0.106 0.106
Note: The empirical model is ∆ log(Trade j,t) = α j + γ(et)× ovt−1 + φos ˆξost + φgd ˆξgdt +
φod ˆξodt + δ∆ log(Y j,t−1) + θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) + ρ∆ log(Trade j,t−1) + u j,t, where ovt = S Dt,
RVt or GARCHt. The time-varying coefficient γ(e j,t) = γ0 + γ1e j,t, and e j,t is the
total primary energy consumption per unit of GDP to measure energy efficiency.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the
null at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 8: Benchmark Empirical Results: (Quarterly Data, 1984Q1–2009Q4 with 17 Countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oil Price Volatility
S Dt−1 -1.955*** -1.921***
( 0.142 ) ( 0.142 )
RVt−1 -0.521*** -0.536***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 )
GARCHt−1 -28.996*** -29.760***
( 2.085 ) ( 2.129 )
∆ log(Trade j,t−1) -0.504*** -0.519*** -0.523*** -0.528*** -0.552*** -0.556***
( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.024 )
ˆξost -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
ˆξ
gd
t 0.002 0.005* 0.006**
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 )
ˆξodt -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008***
( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.003 )
∆ log(Y j,t−1) -0.059 -0.053 -0.049
( 0.043 ) ( 0.042 ) ( 0.042 )
∆ log(Y∗j,t−1) 0.337*** 0.370*** 0.360***
( 0.046 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.046 )
R2 0.286 0.298 0.288 0.317 0.334 0.322
Note: The empirical model is ∆ log(Trade j,t) = α j + βovt−1 + φos ˆξost + φgd ˆξgdt + φod ˆξodt +
δ∆ log(Y j,t−1)+ θ∆ log(Y∗j,t−1)+ρ∆ log(Trade j,t−1)+u j,t, where ovt = S Dt, RVt or GARCHt.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Figure 1: Monthly Oil Prices (World Average): 1957:M1–2011:M6
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Figure 2: Annual Structural Shocks Identified in the Structural VAR Model (equation (1)):
1984–2008
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Figure 3: Annual Oil Price Volatility: 1984–2008
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Figure 4: Quarterly Structural Shocks Identified in the Structural VAR Model (equation (1)):
1984:Q1–2009:Q4
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Figure 5: Quarterly Oil Price Volatility: 1984:Q1–2009:Q4
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